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NO. 52 DECEMBER 2018 Introduction 
Myanmar, the Rohingya Crisis, and 
Further EU Sanctions 
Felix Heiduk 
The violence against the Rohingya, which has led hundreds of thousands of Rohingya 
to seek refuge in Bangladesh, has severely damaged Myanmar’s international image. 
In response to the deterioration of the human rights situation in Myanmar in Octo-
ber 2018, the European Union (EU) threatened to withdraw the trade preferences that 
ensure the country has duty-free access to the EU common market. It seems highly 
plausible, however, that such measures would fail to alter the political calculations 
of the Burmese government or of the military. Instead, a withdrawal of the trade 
preferences would primarily hit the mostly female workers in the country’s textile 
industry. The EU and its Member States should therefore consider a combination 
of specific sanctions against military enterprises as well as tightened entry bans and 
account freezes that are directed at leading military personnel. These targeted sanc-
tions against Myanmar’s armed forces should be flanked by an increase in the level 
of diplomatic engagement with civilian actors in the country. 
 
The NLD (National League for Democracy), 
under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, 
emerged as the winner of the first free par-
liamentary elections in Myanmar on 8 No-
vember 2015. The NLD’s election victory 
was widely perceived in the West to firmly 
set the country on the path towards democ-
racy – a misjudgement that has become 
highly visible in the context of the Rohingya 
crisis. After all, Myanmar’s transition to 
democracy since 2010 has taken place under 
the control of the military – the same 
forces that had ruled the country with an 
iron fist for decades. This specific aspect of 
Myanmar’s democratisation process is plain 
to see when one examines the current con-
stitution, which guarantees the military 
25 per cent of all seats in the legislature. 
In addition, the constitution cannot be 
amended without a greater than 75 per cent 
share of the vote, which provides the mili-
tary with a de facto blocking faction in 
the new, “democratic” Myanmar. Powerful 
ministries such as those of Defence, the 
Interior, and the Border Guard, are in the 
hands of the military, too. The constitution 
furthermore enables the military to declare 
a state of emergency at any time. Hence, 
Myanmar’s current political system is best 
understood as a hybrid of civil and military 
rule. Both the NLD and the military have, 
for the time being, come to terms with the 
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status quo. The NLD has postponed any 
constitutional amendments until the next 
legislative period. In return, the military 
does not curtail the NLD’s legislative activ-
ities and grants Aung San Suu Kyi a leading 
role in the peace process with the armed 
ethnic groups and in foreign policy. The red 
lines that continue to inhibit Myanmar’s 
democratisation process have prominently 
come to the fore in the wake of the Rohingya 
crisis. Since the NLD took over the govern-
ment, the party’s criticisms of the military’s 
human rights violations have been silenced, 
as have calls for a comprehensive reform of 
the security sector. Moreover, under the 
banner of defending the national interest, 
such as safeguarding territorial integrity 
and combating terrorism, the NLD has often 
come to adopt the positions and policy 
preferences of conservative elements within 
the armed forces. As a result, the armed 
forces – with the support of large sections 
of the population and with the backing of 
the government – were able, for example, 
to expel the Rohingya under the guise of 
conducting large-scale “counter-terrorism” 
operations. 
Two narratives of the 
Rohingya crisis 
In Myanmar and the West, two completely 
different narratives on the Rohingya crisis 
have emerged. The uncontrolled influx of 
“illegal immigrants” from Bangladesh and 
the attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salva-
tion Army (ARSA) on police stations in 
August 2017 have been widely identified as 
the triggers for the conflict in Rakhine by 
the armed forces, as well as the media, the 
NLD leadership, and subsequently large 
parts of the general population. ARSA’s co-
ordinated attacks, in which 12 police offic-
ers lost their lives, were framed as a serious 
terrorist threat to the stability of Myanmar. 
According to the official reading, ARSA’s 
aim is to establish an Islamic state on the 
territory of Myanmar and to subsequently 
drive out the Buddhist population. ARSA is 
said to have connections to the so-called 
Islamic State, is believed to have been estab-
lished and financed with foreign support, 
and to have more than 1,000 armed fight-
ers. As a reaction to the “terrorist threat” 
posed by ARSA, the security forces applied 
their infamous “four cuts” strategy, which 
had already been used by the military for 
many years to quell the country’s many 
other ethnic insurgencies. The strategy aims 
to cut off food, financial resources, informa-
tion, and support to any insurgents. The 
civilian population, which is believed to be 
the main supplier of the four resources to 
the insurgents, was thus declared a legiti-
mate target of counterinsurgency measures, 
leading to the aforementioned consequences 
for many Rohingya. Both the government 
and the majority of the population usually 
either dismiss reports of violence against 
the Rohingya as “Islamist propaganda”, or 
they classify it as unavoidable collateral 
damage. Thus, the Rohingya crisis is still 
primarily interpreted as being a “terrorism 
problem” in Myanmar, and the military’s 
actions therefore have widespread support. 
In this reading, the West has, first of all, 
fallen victim to a well-orchestrated inter-
national Islamist propaganda campaign. 
Second, the West’s one-sided criticism of 
the Myanmar government and military fails 
to take into account the realities on the 
ground in Rakhine. 
The discourse on the Rohingya crisis in 
large parts of the West and in Myanmar’s 
neighbouring states is remarkably different. 
Here the main causes of the conflict are 
seen as having stemmed from the decades 
of structural violence against the Rohingya 
as second-class citizens, as well as from the 
excessive use of force by the security forces 
against the Rohingya in the aftermath of 
the ARSA attacks in 2017. According to ex-
ternal observers, the military’s actions have 
now taken on the characteristics of a geno-
cide against the Rohingya. The fact that the 
NLD government was complicit in the ex-
cesses through its silence has made it even 
more difficult to manage the conflict in 
Rakhine. Only massive international pres-
sure can prevent a genocide of the Rohingya. 
The crisis can only be solved if the recom-
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mendations drawn up by the United 
Nations (UN) are swiftly and fully imple-
mented. These include establishing a path-
way to citizenship and full civil rights for 
the Rohingya, freedom of movement, an 
independent investigation of alleged 
human rights violations, and the repatria-
tion of displaced people. Both narratives 
could not be more different from one an-
other with regard to their descriptions of 
the key characteristics of the Rohingya 
crisis, their causal analysis, and their 
recommendations for action. What both 
have in common, however, is the lack of 
reference to the other side’s respective 
interpretation of events in Rakhine. 
Brussels’ reaction 
In response to the Rohingya crisis, the Euro-
pean Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Trade is currently considering whether to 
withdraw the EU trade preferences granted 
to Myanmar in 2013. As part of its “Every-
thing but Arms” (EBA) initiative, the EU 
guarantees duty-free and quota-free access 
to the EU’s common market for all goods 
except arms to economically underdevel-
oped states. States wanting to participate 
in the EBA initiative can only do so if they 
ensure compliance with labour and human 
rights standards. Myanmar had already lost 
access to the EBA initiative once before 
during the military dictatorship. It was only 
granted the right to rejoin the EBA initia-
tive in 2013 in the context of the country’s 
liberalisation process. 
The main beneficiary of Myanmar’s duty-
free and quota-free access to the EU’s com-
mon market since 2013 has been the Bur-
mese textile industry. The textile industry 
had been badly hit in 2003 by the sanctions 
imposed by the United States against the 
ruling military junta. Before 2003, the United 
States had taken almost half of Burma’s 
textile exports. Following the imposition of 
sanctions, a large number of textile mills 
had to close within a few months, and 
between 100,000 and 200,000 – mostly 
female – employees lost their jobs. In the 
meantime, the textile industry has recovered 
and employs well over half a million work-
ers. The reason for this upswing has been 
steadily rising demand – in the United 
States, and especially in the EU – since 2013. 
Almost half of Myanmar’s textile exports 
now go to the EU, and the figure is predicted 
to rise to 60 per cent by 2019. According to 
Burmese trade unions and employers’ asso-
ciations, the withdrawal of trade prefer-
ences granted under the EBA initiative 
would have a serious impact on the textile 
sector. Not only would there be a threat of 
massive losses in orders – and thus further 
factory closures and mass layoffs – many of 
the dismissed workers would also be forced 
into the informal sector or forced to migrate 
to neighbouring countries. 
The current threat by EU Trade Commis-
sioner Cecilia Malmström to withdraw trade 
preferences is based on the assumption that 
the socio-economic consequences of a with-
drawal of trade preferences would force the 
Burmese government to change its policy 
towards the Rohingya. The EU’s existing 
sanctions – imposed in 2018 in response 
to the escalation of violence in Rakhine – 
had had no effect in this respect. In addi-
tion to a ban on military cooperation with 
the armed forces and security forces and 
a tightening of the arms embargo, the cur-
rent sanctions regime also includes entry-
bans into the EU for seven members of the 
Burmese security forces who have been 
demonstrably involved in human rights 
violations against Rohingya as well as the 
freezing of their assets. 
Although it appears sensible and neces-
sary for Europe to increase its pressure on 
Myanmar, the withdrawal of trade prefer-
ences is a rather blunt sword in the EU’s 
arsenal. Although such a measure would 
showcase a value-based EU foreign policy 
as well as the ability of the EU to achieve 
foreign policy coherence, the primary goal 
of persuading Myanmar’s government and 
military to change their behaviour is un-
likely to be accomplished. It is plausible to 
assume – given the experience with pre-
vious sanctions against Myanmar – that 
workers in the textile industry and their 
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families will be disproportionately hard hit 
by such measures. Moreover, growing inter-
national pressure has already led to partial 
solidarity with the military among the gen-
eral Burmese public. The “West” – in which 
the NLD leadership and many ordinary 
Burmese had seen an unconditional ally 
during the military dictatorship – is now 
viewed by many as a “false friend”. In turn, 
Myanmar’s leadership and public have 
begun to reorient themselves towards China. 
Alternative options for the EU 
Although the Myanmar government an-
nounced in November 2017 that it would 
support repatriation of the Rohingya and 
subsequently erected camps and return 
centres for 30,000 people in two districts on 
the border with Bangladesh in the summer 
of 2018, a bilateral repatriation agreement 
between Myanmar and Bangladesh has 
not yet been implemented because the Ro-
hingya refused to return to Myanmar. The 
reason for this lies in the Burmese govern-
ment’s refusal to guarantee the Rohingya 
full civil rights and freedom of movement. 
Also the tense security situation in Rakhine 
has not significantly improved for the Ro-
hingya. As a result, more than 15,000 
Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh in 2018, 
according to the UN. 
Against this background, the EU is well-
advised to increase the pressure on the mili-
tary. This, however, requires targeted sanc-
tions, which primarily target the security 
forces and their cronies. One option would 
be to impose economic sanctions on the 
two largest military conglomerates: The 
Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. 
and Myanmar Economic Corp. Through 
these umbrella companies, the military is 
involved in a whole range of economic sec-
tors, including gems, tourism, transport, 
banking, and real estate. The shareholders 
are active and retired military personnel. 
Most foreign direct investment in Myanmar 
currently goes into companies that either 
directly belong to the military conglomer-
ates or are at least affiliated with them. 
However, there is still little known about 
many of the military’s manifold economic 
activities. A precise mapping of the mili-
tary’s entrepreneurial activities in Myan-
mar – developed in cooperation with re-
search institutes and non-governmental 
organisations – could provide the basis for 
future punitive measures that directly tar-
get the security forces. Another option for 
additional sanctions, which could be taken 
either as an alternative or in combination 
with economic sanctions, would be the ex-
tension of entry bans and the freezing of 
accounts of leading military personnel who 
were, and are, involved in the expulsion of 
the Rohingya. So far, the military top eche-
lon, such as General Min Aung Hlaing, the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, 
or his Deputy General, Soe Win, have not 
been sanctioned at all. Even if it is unrealis-
tic to assume that further EU sanctions will 
lead to immediate changes in attitude and 
behaviour of the dominant actors in the 
country, it is nevertheless important – 
given the symbolic power and demonstra-
tion of adherence to principles – to apply 
such coercive measures. 
In addition, it seems highly advisable to 
put increased international pressure on the 
military through strong diplomatic engage-
ment of civilian actors in the country. 
Channels of communication should be kept 
open at all civilian levels. Moreover, dia-
logue with Myanmar on the European side 
should not be limited to expressing deep 
concerns about the crisis in Rakhine, but 
should aim to engage with local partners at 
the practical level on managing the Rohingya 
crisis. The EU would furthermore be well-
advised to maintain – and if possible, ex-
pand – its cooperation on conflict manage-
ment in other conflict-ridden parts of the 
country, which currently go almost unno-
ticed by the international community. 
Dr Felix Heiduk is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Asia Division. 
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